Norman Podhoretz’s new book, Why Are Jews Liberals?, is the subject of smart and sharp review by Leon Wieseltier in the New York Times Book Review.
If you want to read Podhoretz’s thesis unfiltered and don’t expect to read the book, he’s written a piece for the Wall Street Journal with the same title.
There’s a lot to chew over in Podhoretz’s oped, but I was struck by this:
Most American Jews sincerely believe that their liberalism, together with their commitment to the Democratic Party as its main political vehicle, stems from the teachings of Judaism and reflects the heritage of “Jewish values.” But if this theory were valid, the Orthodox would be the most liberal sector of the Jewish community. After all, it is they who are most familiar with the Jewish religious tradition and who shape their lives around its commandments.
Yet the Orthodox enclaves are the only Jewish neighborhoods where Republican candidates get any votes to speak of. Even more telling is that on every single cultural issue, the Orthodox oppose the politically correct liberal positions taken by most other American Jews precisely because these positions conflict with Jewish law.
A couple of points here. Don’t be so sure that the Orthodox adopt the political decisions that are most in synch with Jewish law. Yes, the O.U. is opposed to gay marriage on religious grounds (and, while also invoking halacha, has called for a moratorium on capital punishment, by the way). They’re discomfort with abortion is halachically motivated (although hardly leads them into a full embrace of the pro-life movement).
But on a big issue like church-state, the Orthodox support for school vouchers and the like seems more motivated by financial imperatives than ethical and religious ones. Similarly, support for faith-based initiatives is driven by financial self-interest as much as it is by philosophical agreement with the evangelical movement.
The ultra-Orthodox enclaves tend to vote as a bloc, not for the candidate with the best family values, but the candidate who can deliver the most to the community in terms of security, schools, lower taxes, and social welfare. It’s only at the presidential level that the Orthdoox vote has become so markedly Republican.
Where they do diverge with the non-Orthodox majority (in general) is on Israel, and that is surely a religious divide. If you believe the land is God-given, you are bound to be more hawkish in retaining control of said land and supporting the politicans who take a hard line on Arabs. But the Orthodox hardliner is a fairly recent political phenomenon, dating to Rav Kook and his philosohical heirs, whose religious Zionism replaced the more common halachic response to Zionism, which had been theolgoical indifference or active opposition.
The strongly Israel-centric Podhoretz might have been less enamored of the Orthodox rabbis who 80 years ago resisted political Zionism. At that time, it was the secular Zionists — even socialist Zionists, perish the thought — who did the most to make Israel a political reality. And they were certainly not adherents of halacha.
Podhoretz also asserts that the Orthodox are the most “familiar” with Jewish law and thus implies that their politics are the most valid political expressions of Jewish law, and thus Judaism. But it seems a little convenient, as the former editor of a political magazine about Jewish concerns, to accept the Orthodox worldview on politics as the most authentic Jewish politics while essentially rejecting Orthodox social and cultural values. Anyone who finds this assertion of Podhoretz convincing – that only the Orthodox can lay claim to Jewish political values — has two choices. He can reject the entire notion of non-Orthodox Jewish political activity — even his own, if he’s not Orthodox. Or he should be prepared to adopt a full Orthodox lifestyle. And presumably, the more Orthodox the better.
But I won’t hold my breath until I see the staff or loyal readers of Commentary shun Western literature, art or pop culture; adopt sharply circumscibed gender roles; devalue university education in exchange for a life of Talmud Torah; move to increasingly insular neighborhoods; submit to the central authority of a rebbe or beit din; adopt the rules of family purity; shun military service (if they live in Israel); or wear distinctive clothing that sets them apart from other people.
After all, if you feel the Orthodox are the “most Jewish” in their political choices, why stop there?
Of course, one might argue that Judaism has expressed itself in myriad ways certainly since the Enlightenment and well before, and “authenticity” is not measured by a strict adherence, or singluar interpretation, of halacha. Rather, it can be expressed in a sense of peoplehood, responsiblity to Judaism’s continuation and transmission, commitment to modes of prayer, language, and study, responsibility to rescuing or providing for fellow Jews. Does Podhroetz believe the Reform and Conservative seminaries are huge historical mistakes, distorting Judaism beyond all recognition (he might, actually, but where are his payess, exactly?). Does he believe it’s been all downhill for us since the Emancipation, and Judaism would be healthier were its non-Orthodox adherents to disappear and the Orthodox emerge as the sole practitioners — or had we never left the ghetto?
Wieseltier writes that “Podhoretz’s book is punctuated with a voyeuristic admiration for the Orthodox.” Is it admiration for the Orthodox, or a certain amount of self-disdain and regret for his non-Orthodox life and intellectual pursuits?